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International Income
Taxation

By

Michael J. Graetz*

Much of what I will say here
today is distilled from articles
that I have written and things I
have learned in putting together
a book called FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION.'

It is difficult enough to fashion
sensible tax policy in the domestic
arena. The debate, for example, over
whether the United States should
impose a value-added tax has some
international aspects, but it is primarily a debate about domestic
policy. This is true generally about
the debate over how much we should
rely on income versus consumption taxation. This debate amply
illustrates how hard it is to obtain
agreement on principles when we
have, what Fred Goldberg calls,
one Caesar claiming the revenues.
In international affairs, we have at
least two Caesars-two national governments-with legitimate claims to
tax the income. We must decide how
to divide the tax dollars between the
two Caesars. Multinational corporations strive to pay taxes to neither.
Disputes are inevitable. It is therefore
very important to think about the
underlying principles of international taxation and to be explicit about
what we are trying to achieve.

The Normative
Underpinnings
C
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Unfortunately and importantly,
policymakers' longstanding un-

derstanding of the normative
underpinnings of international
tax policy is thoroughly unsatisfactory. I have made this point
in detail elsewhere. The essential
problem is that at least since 1962,
when subpart F was enacted, the
Treasury Department and the
Joint Committee on Taxation have
looked to capital export neutrality
(CEN)and capital import neutrality (CIN) or "competitiveness" as
a guide to U.S. international tax
policy. It is now well known that
we cannot have both CEN and
CIN simultaneously whenever
there are differences in the tax
base or tax rates between two
countries. What that means is
that setting policy becomes free
play. If the policy guideline is to
compromise between CEN and
CIN, that is no guideline at all.
You can compromise anywhere.
Several of us have been recently
searching for the proper guide to
international tax policy. This is
a very important quest. Whether
Mihir's new idea of "capital ownership neutrality"2 advances the
ball sufficiently remains to be
seen, but at least it's an admirable
effort. I must, however, admit to
some skepticism since this norm
is grounded solely on worldwide
economic efficiency.
MichaelJ. Graetz is theJustus S. Hotchkiss
Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
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I believe, and I have written
about this a good bit, that the
fundamental question we ought
to be asking is what policy is
in the United States' national
interest? What rules will best
serve the long-term interests of
the American people? That is the
question we normally ask about
other nontax international
policies, and that is the basic
question we ought to ask about
international tax policy. There is
no reason to depart here in favor
of worldwide norms.
The great difficulty then becomes knowing what to do-the
problem of empirical uncertainty.
It is very difficult to get satisfactory information about the
consequences of alternative policy
decisions. Contested facts inevitably play an important role. For
example, does foreign expansion
by U.S. multinationals reduce or
expand American jobs? We don't
know with certainty the extent to
which capital used abroad replaces
capital that would otherwise be
deployed in the United States, or
whether instead the capital that
is deployed abroad is complimentary to capital in the United States
and will increase U.S. jobs. These
are empirical questions. We need
better information about them in
order to make a firm judgment
about international tax policiesfor example, about the effect of
substituting an exemption system
for our credit system-on the welfare of the American people.
Looking to advance the wellbeing of the American people
does not necessarily mean that
we should always adopt policies
advancing the competitiveness of
U.S. multinationals. What is good
for General Motors is not always
good for Uncle Sugar. Advancing
the competitive position of U.S.
multinationals may or may not be

the right answer, depending on the
issue and the circumstances.

Taxing Business
Income
We have talked here today a lot about
taxing active business income and in
particular about the debate between
a credit system and an exemption
system. I want to make a few comments about this. If you go back to
the origins of U.S. international tax
policy-and I think looking at this
history is quite useful-you will discover that the foreign tax credit was
not put into the Code to promote
capital export neutrality. It was enacted for mercantilist reasons. It was the
policy of the U.S. to encourage U.S.
companies to go abroad and trade.
The limitation on the foreign tax
credit was put in the law a few years
later to protect U.S. taxation of U.S.
source income. An unlimited credit
would allow taxpayers to escape U.S.
tax on U.S. source income. The principle that T.S. Adams, who was the
person who designed our foreign tax
credit system, had in mind in the
case of business income was that the
prime claim between the two Caesars
to the tax revenue is the claim of the
country of source. Adams insisted
that the country where the income
is produced is the country in which
income tax should be levied, and
the country from which the capital
is supplied should defer to the country where the income is produced.
The primacy of source-based claims
to income taxes on active business
income has been a feature not only
of the U.S. system, but of all OECD
tax systems, since 1918. The other
principle that motivated the system
introduced in the United States in
1918 and 1921 and the League of Nation's model treaty in 1928 was that
we should avoid double taxation. If
the source country claims the tax

on income, the residence country
should not tax it again. T.S. Adams
also thought that we should be worried about zero taxation.
The best empirical evidence to
date suggests that most foreign
active business activity is complimentary to U.S. business activities
and not a substitute for it. This
means that where active business
income is involved, there is considerable evidence that the activities
abroad of U.S. multinationals
usually enhance U.S. welfare and
promote U.S. jobs. There is more
work to be done on this question,
but producing abroad is often how
U.S. companies exploit a whole
host of advantages in terms of
both proprietary intangibles and
economies of scale and scope.
Given our system for taxing
active business income, where we
concede the primacy of sourcebased taxation, an exemption
system and our credit system
with deferral generally for active
business income are not terribly
far apart. One of the lessons of
the work on exemption that Paul
Oosterhuis and I did was to demonstrate how the two approaches
are very close, although they differ
3
in a few important respects.
One major difference is that with
an exemption system there is no
cost for repatriations, for bringing
money back to the home country.
Under a credit system, there often
is much tax planning, as everyone
here knows well, to avoid incremental U.S. income tax when money
is brought back into the United
States. I believe the major advantage of an exemption system is to
eliminate that burden.
I personally favor slightly an
exemption system over our credit
system, but there are questions that
must be answered with an exemption
system. Should we exempt all foreign
source income or exempt only in-
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come that has been previously taxed,
and, if so, taxed at what rate? With
exemption, we clearly would have
to maintain a subpart F equivalent
for passive income. That inevitably
raises the questions, which we discussed here all morning, relating to
the treatment of subpart F base-company income and the like.
One critical point is that U.S.
businesses generally do not like
an exemption system. You might
think, given all the noise about
international competitiveness, that
U.S. businesses would embrace a
system that would exempt their
foreign business income from U.S.
taxation. But they do not embrace
it. The reason is that with an exemption system the United States would
tax foreign source royalty income,
which it does not now tax because
in practice such income can be sheltered through the use of foreign tax
credits. So the U.S. multinational
community says, "Thank you very
much, but we don't want it. Please
don't exempt our income abroad."
The simplification advantages
that are claimed for an exemption
system are often overstated, particularly if Congress decreases the
number of baskets for foreign tax
credits from nine to two. We surely
have a more complicated foreign tax
credit system than we need. Thinking about an exemption system does
point to some potential simplifications of the foreign tax credit, and
decreasing the number of baskets is
one of them, but I do not think that
simplification is a good reason to
move to an exemption system.

Taxing Portfolio
Income
Another piece of the international
tax puzzle is the taxation of portfolio income. I have recently
written an article with Itai Grin-

berg on this subject.' The previous
literature almost completely ignores portfolio income. Virtually
all of the literature is about taxing
business income.
The taxation of portfolio
income was, after all, only a
small consideration in 1918 and
1921. There were no doubt a few
wealthy people who had some international portfolio income, but
taxing business income drove the
design of our system for taxing
international income. The experts
have not thought much about taxing portfolio income. The recent
growth in international portfolio
income, however, is very dramatic.
The numbers are staggering regarding the international flows
of portfolio income. We need to
re-examine this issue.
Many of the features of direct
investments are not present for
portfolio income. In particular,
neither capital export neutrality nor capital import neutrality
are important, because portfolio
investors do not decide the locations of plant or equipment.
Capital ownership neutrality, to
the extent I understand it, is also
not relevant because it is concerned with the management of
the firm and, therefore, addresses
only direct investment. So none
of the criteria we talk about most
in international taxation apply to
international portfolio income.
Portfolio income flows very
differently from the way direct
investments operate. Portfolio
investments move much more
rapidly. They leave when the milk
becomes sour. We have seen this in
the outflows prompted by the Mexican and Asian financial crises.
In my view, there is a strong
argument for the primacy of residency-based taxation for foreign
portfolio income. Otherwise, the
residence nation loses the ability to

tax people on their ability to pay
if residents can avoid progressive
taxation simply by moving their
portfolio income abroad. Those
who believe in the primacy of residence-based taxation for portfolio
income should take seriously the
idea of allowing only a deduction
taxes
for foreign withholding
5
rather than a credit.
The real problem with portfolio income, which is related to
today's discussions about the real
problems with transfer pricing, is
the residence nations' inability to
collect tax on foreign portfolio
income. There is a lack of information flowing between countries.
The critical question is whether
multilateral cooperation, multilateral innovations, and expanded
information reporting will get us
to a point where we can collect
tax on portfolio income earned
abroad. Greater multilateral cooperation is essential.
This is related to the pervasive
problem of enforcement inadequacy generally. The IRS is able
to engage only in limited enforcement. IRS efforts, for example, to
determine who has foreign bank
accounts by looking at debit cards
in foreign banks were well-publicized, but after the IRS found all
these people-which was a shocking number-there was not much
it could do about collecting the
tax owed because of inadequate
resources. It is impossible to enforce an income tax in the modern
world if Congress doesn't give the
IRS the resources to do its job.

Outdated Concepts
Let me make two other general comments. The first is about
outdated concepts. We have an
international income tax system
built on concepts that are no
longer relevant, if they ever were.

U
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Corporate residence is perhaps
the best example. The idea of
income taxation of a multinational corporation turning on its
residence seems bizarre in today's
world. Corporate residence may
have made sense in the early 20th
century, when our international
tax rules were put in place, but it
makes no sense in the 21st century.
We need to decrease or eliminate
those income tax consequences
that depend on where a corporation is resident.
Our source classifications-although we have not talked about
this here today-also suffer major
shortcomings in a world where
financial derivatives are commonplace. The idea that we can readily
distinguish interest, dividends and
capital gains is tenuous. E-commerce also obviously imposes
important challenges for source
rules. The source rules need to be
re-thought. That work has not yet
really begun.
I also want to say a few words
about transfer pricing, which everyone agrees is a crucial problem.
The argument to date has been
between arm's-length approaches
on the one hand, and formulary
approaches on the other. This argument is, I think, archaic for several
reasons. The formulary methods of
apportionment that the states rely
on to apportion their taxes have
nothing specifically in their formulas for intangibles. As we all know,
intangibles have become crucially
important to the production of
income. Perhaps sales, to some extent, play a role in substituting for
a specific value for intangibles. This
may be why some analysts have
called for allocating some income
to the country of consumption.
As an alternative to the states'
formulas, the profit-split methods
of the Code Sec. 482 regulations
have began to give us some new

ideas that move toward new formulary-type apportionments. We
should ask whether new profit-split
methods might also help solve the
critical source questions. There may
be an opportunity for profit-split
ideas to help in solving source questions as well as addressing transfer
pricing issues. There seems to be
some genuine promise here.
To return to David Rosembloom's
earlier example, my fundamental
question is whether the correct
number for income in Bermuda
is really $25. If it is really $25 of
income earned in Bermuda and
it is really active business income,
then whether to impose an income
tax is up to Bermuda. But I don't
believe the number is $25. I believe
it's closer to $5.That debate goes to
the heart of David's question.6

The Role of
International
Organizations
One issue that has not been mentioned at all here today and that
we generally are not sufficiently
alert to in the United States is the
increasing role of international organizations in the international tax
arena. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has made its relevance
apparent with its adverse ETI decision. But, with the exception of the
WTO, we have not thought enough
about how international organizations are operating and how they
potentially will affect our international tax policies.
Take the EU, for example, and
in particular the way the Europe
Court of Justice (ECJ) has been
affecting the income tax arena.
Under current EU treaties and the
new draft constitution of the EU,
the ECJ has the power to strike
down income tax laws. But there is
no power within the EU to create

income tax laws absent unanimous
agreement of the member states.
The retreat from imputation credit
methods of corporate integration
in the EU was, in my view,
prompted in substantial part by
decisions of the European Court
of Justice. Recent ECJ decisions
on earnings stripping threaten the
ability of nations within the EU to
collect corporate taxes whenever
corporate structures are heavily
debt-financed. The treatment of
foreign losses by the ECJ is a
further example. We need to pay
attention to these developments
because as European nations
change their tax systems in response to ECJ decisions, they may
well change policy calculations for
us. The ECJ is becoming a new
source of pressure on our own international income tax policies.
This development also may
undermine to some significant
degree the OECD's longstanding
role as the arbiter of international
tax rules. The OECD's efforts to
address what it labeled harmful tax
competition may be an instance of
the OECD's waning authority, not
only in setting substantive rules, but
also in inducing multi-lateral enforcement cooperation, which also
is currently being questioned. This
threat to multi-lateral enforcement
is no accident. The U.S. proponents
of inhibiting the OECD's ability
to promote information exchanges
for foreign capital income include,
for example, entities, such as the
Heritage Foundation and the Cato
Institute, who have been urging that
we should not have an income tax
in the United States and that capital
income should not be taxed. The
link between these two positions
is apparent. If globalization means
that governments cannot collect
the income tax on capital income,
it becomes difficult to keep the incontinued on page 241
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25 TAX NOTES 453, 469-70, 472 73
(1984). According to that discussion,
Code Sec. 1 091(e)(1) was enacted to
address the following transaction: A
cash-method taxpayer enters into a
short-against-the- box transaction by
buying stock and simultaneously selling it short. If the stock rises in value
at year-end, the taxpayer sells the long
position at a gain and purchases new
stock to close the short position at a
loss in such a manner that the trade
date for those transactions falls at the
end of one year and the settlement
date in the following year. Under the
law at the time, the gain on the long
position was deferred to the following
year, while the loss on the short position was taken into account in the first
year. See Rev. Rul. 70-344, 1970-2
CB 50, Rev. Rul. 78-270, 1978-2
CB 215; Rev. Rul. 82-227, 1982-2
CB 89; Rev. Rul. 93-84, 1993-2 CB
225 (declaring Rev. Rul. 70-344, Rev.
Rul. 78-270 and Rev. Rul. 82-227
obsolete). If the stock fell in value at
year-end, the taxpayer would close the
transaction in the same manner and
both gain and loss (under the wash
sale rules) would be deferred until the
following year. Code Sec. 453(k)(2)
now generally provides that both gain
and loss on such transactions must be
taken into account in the first year.
W Doyle, CA-7, 61-1 USTC 9237, 286
F2d 654 (1961).
s Rev. Rul. 59-418, 19592 CB 184,
addresses a transaction that is similar
to Doyle, except that the taxpayer entered into a forward contract to sell the
stock rather than a short sale. The ruling holds that the taxpayer disposed of
the shares at the time he entered into
the forward contract. The current validity of this ruling is quite dubious, as
it contradicts the normal tax treatment
of forward contracts with no apparent
authority for doing so, and the Seventh
Circuit in Doyle later rejected exactly
the same argument with respect to the
short sale in that case.
86 Note in this regard that the
issue of
whether the taxpayer is economically
"long" or "short" is completely different from the issue of whether the
taxpayer has purchased or sold the
option. A taxpayer may be "long"
stock (make money if the stock rises,
lose money if it falls) by purchasing a
call option or by selling a put option.
A taxpayer may be "short" stock (make
money if the stock falls, lose money if
it rises) by purchasing a put option or
by selling a call option.
87 See Code Sec. 1233(b) (flush language) ("For purposes of this section, the acquisition of on option to
sell property at a fixed price shall be

considered as a short sale, and the
exercise or failure to exercise such option shall be considered as a closing
of such short sale"); Reg. §1 12331 (c)(3) (same); see also Hoover Co.,
72 TC 206, Dec. 36,032 (1979)
("short" foreign currency forward
contracts treated as short sales for
purposes of Code Sec. 1233). The
close relationship between the wash
sale and short sale rules is primarily
derived from the fact that they use
the same definition of "substantially
identical." See Reg. §1 .1233-1 (d).
88 See, e.g., TAM 7730002 (Apr. 14,
1977) (Code Sec. 1091 cannot apply
to a situation in which an option writer
closes out an option since the grantor
does not "acquire" property within the
meaning of Code Sec. 1091); LTR
8517029 (Jan. 29, 1985) (Code Sec.
1234, rather than Code Sec. 1091,
governs situations in which an option
writer closes out his or her previously
issued call option). Some practitioners
believe that if the old and new call
are written with the same counterparty,
however, there may be a nonstatutory
basis for deferring the loss.
88 The portfolio rules of Reg. §1.2465(c)(1) may seem like an odd model,
given that they qualify as an example
of some of the problems with writing
complex rules. Notwithstanding that,
the rules are quite reasonable as a
big picture matter, meaning that it is
appropriate to treat baskets of small
numbers of stock or securities on an
instrument-by-instrument basis and to
deal with larger baskets on a portfolio basis. The problem with the Reg.
§1.246-5(c)(1) rules is in the details.
Many of those problems might have
been identified and fixed ifthe IRS
had proposed those rules in their
current form and allowed taxpayers
to comment on them.
9 See note 65, supro, for a discussion
of possible approaches to determining
whether it is likely that an option will be
exercised.
See Reg. §1.382-4(d).
92 See Reg. §1. 1092(c)-4(e) and the discussion in note 65, supro.
9'Reg- §1 1001 -3(e)(4) provides that there
is a change in payment expectations if
an obligor's ability to pay prior to a
transaction isadequate, and it becomes
speculative as a result of the transaction,
or vice versa.
9 This recommendation is not novel.
See, e.g., New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on
Proposed Straddle Legislation, at
Part VII.A (Mar. 17, 2000). Legislation currently pending in the Senate
provides for such a change.
95M. Honlin, supro note 21, at 430.
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brainwashing (I'm already a member of
the law and economics choir; see my
dissent in Claon Gas Co., L.P., 1] 9 TC
197, Dec. 54,919, at 215-17 (2002),
rev'd, CA-8, 2004-1 USTC 50,123,
), are answered by the comment
F3d
in Advisory Opinion No. 67 that:
The education of judges in various academic disciplines serves
the public interest. That a lecture
or seminar may emphasize a
particular viewpoint or school of
thought does not in itself preclude
a judge from attending. Judges
are continually exposed to competing views and are trained to
weigh them.
But see S. 787, the "Fair and Independent Judiciary Act of 2003," introduced by
Senators Kerry and Feingold on April 8,
2003, and referred to the Committee of
the Judiciary, which, in addition to restoring cost-of-living increases in federal judges'
salaries, would have imposed severe restrictions on seminars for federal judges. The
bill was not reported out of Committee. A
prior bill containing similar restrictions, S.
2990, the Kerry-Feingold "Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000," introduced July
27, 2000, was disapproved by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and the
Board of the Federal Judicial Center, and
was the subject of a disapproving speech by
the Chief Justice at the ALl Annual Meeting
in Washington, D.C., May 14, 2001.
8B.W Kanter Est., CA-7, 2003-2 USTC
50,605, 337 F3d 833.
9 Gulf Oil Corp., 89 TC 1010, Dec.
44,341 (1987).
1oWilkes-Barre Carriage Co., Inc., 39 TC
839, Dec. 25,991 (1963), and cases
cited at 845-46, aff'd, CA-2, 64-2
USTC 9518, 332 F2d 421, cited with
approval, H.W. Smith, 56 TC 263, at
291, note 17, Dec. 30,773 (1971).
See Montgomery, 122 TC -, No. 1
(2004).
j.D. Shea, 112 TC 183, at 207 09,
Dec. 53,318 (1999).
13 A Dialogue Between Tax Court Judges,
12

46 TAx LAw. 665, 672-77 (1993).
Let the record show at this point that Judge
Beghe interpolated a line from his investiture
speech, attributed to Golda Meier: "Don't
be so humble; you're not that good."
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come tax in force. If we do not have

multilateral enforcement cooperation, we will see something of an

international race to the bottom in
terms of the taxation of income from
capital. We do not need cooperation
in setting tax rates, but we must have
cooperation on information sharing
and tax collection. There is considerable pressure internationally on tax
rates and within the United States
a real effort to move us away from
taxing income toward taxing only
consumption.

Conclusion
Let me close with this observation. I believe the United States
has the wrong mix of taxes. I
have written about this at some
length. We rely much too heavily
on the income tax and not nearly
enough on consumption taxes in
the United States. I do not believe
we should rely entirely on a valueadded tax or other consumption
tax. Nor am I persuaded that we
should eliminate the income tax
altogether. Instead, I would enact
a 10- to 14-percent value-added tax
to finance a $100,000 exemption
from the income tax as well as
a reduction in the top income
tax rate to 25 percent for both
individuals and corporations.
I have detailed this proposal
in a YALE LAW JOURNAL article

The numbers actually work. You
don't need sunsets and phase-ins
and all the other gimmicks now
common in Congress in order
to make this proposal work. It
would have the great advantage
of freeing about 150 million
Americans from having to file
tax returns. And it would be a
much more coherent tax system.
It would allow us to collect taxes
on sales in the United States
through the value added tax
even when we are experiencing
slippage in our ability to collect
the income tax.

m

There are important reasons
to take seriously a fundamental
restructuring of the U.S. tax system domestically. We also need a
fundamental re-thinking of the
international tax regime. This
conference has been an excellent
opportunity for us to begin to debate these issues. Thank you.
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of reported domestic profitability. In fact, the United States
receives greater tax revenue
from the foreign operations
of American companies by
taxing individual dividend
income that it does by taxing
corporate income. For example,
Hines finds that for $100 of after-tax foreign profits generates
$50 more dividends to domestic
shareholders than does $100 of
after-tax domestic profits.

While fears of runaway plants or
a runaway tax base are overblown,
runaway headquarters is a real concern. Measured by deal value, over
the 1998 to 2000 period, 73 to 86
percent of large cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving U.S.
companies have been structured
so that the merged company has
its headquarters abroad. In the
case of Daimler-Chrysler, U.S.
taxes were specifically identified
as a significant factor in determining the location of the new parent
firm. U.S.-based multinationals
have most of their jobs and funds
invested in their parent firms, losing the parents becomes more of a
concern than simply increasing the
amount of investment in foreignowned affiliates.

Conclusions
Multinational corporations are
an integral part of the U.S. economy, and their foreign activities
are part of their domestic success.
Accordingly, we must ensure that
U.S. tax rules do not impact the
ability of U.S. multinationals
to compete successfully around
the world. Policymakers should
continue to review carefully the
U.S. international tax system, including fundamental reforms like
a territorial system, with a view
to removing biases against the
ability of U.S. multinationals to
compete globally. Such reforms
would enhance the well-being of
American families and allow the
United States to retain its world
economic leadership. These
gains should contribute to the
growing interest in fundamental
tax reform.
ENDNOTES
This speech took place on November 14,
2003, and has been edited, annotated
and expanded.

